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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This appeal arises from the Industrial Commission's Order dated August 27, 2013
("Order") and its adoption and approval of Referee Michael Powers's Findings of Fact,
Conclusion of Law, and Recommendation dated August 27, 2013 ("Findings"). In its Order, the
Commission found that the defendant/appellee, Eagle Farms, Inc., and the State Insurance
Fund (collectively "Employer") met their burden of proving that claimant/appellant's, Newman
Kalahan Giles ("Kalil), intoxication was a reasonable and substantial cause of his injuries, such
that Kal was barred from receiving income benefits pursuant to Idaho Code Section 72-208.
This case arises from a motor vehicle accident in which Kal, who was nineteen-years-old
at the time, was seriously injured. On August 17, 2008, Kal was traveling down a highway at
night in Jefferson County, Idaho, when his vehicle left the roadway and crashed. At the time of
the accident, Kal was travelling at approximately 123 miles per hour. Kal was not wearing a
seat belt and was ejected from his vehicle. Evidence in the record suggests that Kal was texting
at the time he crashed. Also, Kal had a blood alcohol content of .11.
Now on appeal, Kal seeks a ruling from this Court that the Commission erred in refusing
to consider evidence that Kal was texting at the time of the accident; the Commission erred in
finding that the Employer met its burden that intoxication was a reasonable and substantial
cause of his injuries; the Commission erred by relying on evidence of Kal's use of legally
prescribed medication; and the Commission erred in refusing to find that Kal's failure to wear a
seat belt was a reasonable and substantial cause of his injuries. For the reasons set forth
APPELLANT'S BRIEF ON APPEAL
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herein, this Court should reverse the Commission, vacate the Commission's Order and Findings
dated August 27, 2013, and hold that the Employer has not met its burden, pursuant to Idaho
Code Section 72-208(2), of proving that intoxication was reasonable and substantial cause of
Kal's injuries.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
A.

Background.

Kal has an Axis 1 diagnosis of attention deficit hyperactivity disorder ("ADHD).l ADHD
causes people to have addictive personalities.
speed.

3

2

One of Kal's major addictions is his addiction to

Kal's "Axis I diagnosis of Attention Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder [causes him] to

engage in risk-taking behavior, including driving at excessive speeds .... ,,4
Kal describes himself as a "huge speeder," says he always goes fast, and that driving 100
miles an hour does not concern him.s Kal's father, Newman William Giles ("Newman"),
describes Kal as a "habitual speeder."

6

Newman says Kal was not a good driver and that he

drove fast.?

1 See 14:7-12 of the deposition transcript of Dr. Joe Anderson dated February 13, 2013 (If Anderson Depo.").
2 Anderson Depo., 14:7-20.
3 Anderson Depo., 14:7-20.
4 See 77:1-10 of the deposition transcript of Gary Anderson, Ph.D., dated October 19, 2012 ("Dawson Depo."); see
also Anderson Depo., 14:7-12
5 See Hearing Transcript ("HT") 33:14-21; See also 20:11-14 of the deposition transcript of Newman "Kal" Giles
dated July 22, 2010 ("Kal Depo.").
6 HT 102:10-11.
7 HT 91:14-23 (Emphasis added).
APPELLANT'S BRIEF ON APPEAL
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Kal's truck was built for speed. Kal's truck was a Chevy Duramax diesel with a V8
8

engine and was tldouble chipped" to make it go faster.

9

The double chip tlamps up the

horsepower tremendously" for "more speed" and tltakes the governor off of the vehicle."l0
The chips gave the truck over 400 horse power.

ll

In addition, Kal's truck had a methanol kit

which included a button you pressed IIw hen you've got the throttle down" to increase the
horsepower and speed,12 and Kal's truck had an adjusted air intake system to make it go
faster.

13

Prior to the accident, Kal bragged that he had the fastest truck in high school and
everyone wanted to ride with him because it was the fastest.

14

Kal's brother's truck (the truck

Kal was driving at the time of the accident) was modified just like Kal's truck to go fast. is
Prior to the accident, Kal had gotten at least three speeding tickets and he had received
several warnings for speeding.

16

Kal was once arrested for driving over 100 miles per hour on

his way from Arizona to Idaho,17 and Kal stated that the Arizona incident was not the only time

8 HT 45:2-6.
9 HT 37:8-9.
10 HT 37:13-22.
11 HT 45:14-18.
12 HT 44:16-45:1.
13 HT 45:7-21.
14 HT 44:3-7.
15 HT 46:12-19.
16 HT 46:20-47:6.
17 HT 49:11-14.
APPELLANT'S BRIEF ON APPEAL
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he had driven over 100 miles per hour.18 Also, Officer Allen Bivins of the Idaho State Police
remembers stopping Kal at least once or twice for speeding, but he did not give Kal a citation.

19

Prior to the accident, Kal described himself as a "big drinker.,,20 Kal has been charged
with three misdemeanor offenses of "Possession of Alcohol by a Minor" in 2005, 2006, and

2007. 21 Also, Kal has had one prior DUI offense,22 and he said he consumed alcohol "daily.,,23
B.

Day Of The Incident.

Kal was an employee of Eagle Farms.24 His job was to check and inspect the sprinkler
pivots on the various farms owned by Eagle Farms.

25

In the early morning of August 17,2008,

Kal drove his brother's Chevy Duramax truck to Terreton, Idaho, to work on a sprinkler pivot
and Jonathan Glodo ("Jonathan") rode with Kal.

26

27

Earlier that evening, Jonathan had been with Kal at Chili's restaurant in Idaho Falls.

28

Kal and Jonathan left Chili's restaurant at approximately 1:00 a.m. and took a friend home.
Then Kal and Jonathan went to Terreton to work on the sprinkler pivot.

3o

29

Kal and Jonathan left

18 HT 48:16-20.
19 HT 77:22-24.
20 HT 32:8-11.
21 See Jefferson County Case No. CR-2007-1809; Fremont County Case No. CR-2006-314; Jefferson County Case No.
CR-2005-274. The case history for these cases was included in the Idaho State Police Report of Corporal Allen W.
Bivins ("Officer Bivins Report").
22 Anderson Oepo., 69:2-13.
23 Kal Oepo., 22:16-25.
24 HT 43:3-5.
25 HT 43:6-15.
26 HT 91:9-11; Bivins Report p.3 and 6.
27 Bivins Report p. 6.
28 Bivins Report p. 6.
29 Bivins Report p. 6.
30 HT 91:9-11; Bivins Report p. 6.
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Terreton at approximately 3:00 a.m. to drive back to Kal's home.

31

Jonathan never saw Kal

drink any alcohol, and even though Jonathan rode in the same truck as Kal, he did not smell
alcohol on Kal's breath.

32

Throughout the evening and early morning hours and prior to Kal's accident, Kal had
been sending and receiving several text messages to and from his friend Ryan Holm. 33

Kal

was sending text messages to Ryan at approximately the same time the car accident happened

(3:30 a.m.).

34

On the way back to Kal's home, at approximately 3:30 a.m., Kal and Jonathan were
involved in a motor vehicle accident traveling south on Old Basset Highway when Kal failed to
negotiate a right-hand curve as he neared 3145 East and ran off the east side of the highway.35
The vehicle traveled down a steep embankment and rolled several times.
accident, Kal was traveling at approximately 123 miles per hour.

50 miles per hour.

37

36

At the time of the

The posted speed limit was

38

Kal was not wearing a seatbelt and was ejected 90 feet from the vehicle.

39

Kal

sustained critical injuries, including a lacerated liver, one broken rib, a severe head injury,

31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39

HT 27:15-20.
Bivins Report p. 6.
HT 50:9-51:6.
HT 50:9-51:6.
HT 58:19:20; 57:5-7; Bivins Report p. 1.
Bivins Report p. 1.
HT 18:25.
HT 59:23-24.
Bivins Report pp. 1, 4, and 5.
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fractured left clavicle, and compression fractures of the vertebrae in the neck and back.

40

Jonathan was wearing his seatbelt, was not ejected from the vehicle, and sustained minor
injuries.

41

Also, at the time of the accident, Kal had a blood alcohol level of .11,42 he was 19-

years-old, and weighed 190 pounds.

C.

43

Newman's Testimony.

Newman is Kal's father.

44

Newman is also Kal's supervisor and an owner of Eagle Farms,

Inc. (a defendant in this case).45 After the accident, Newman sent some of his employees over
to the place of the accident with some flatbeds and track hoes to clean up the wreckage.

46

In

the process of moving the truck, one of the employees found Kal's cellphone and brought it to
Newman.

47

Newman checked the most recent text messages on the cellphone and saw that

there were about 3 or 4 text messages on the phone between the time period of 3:15 a.m. and
3 :30 a.m. the morning of the accident.
Holm.

49

48

The text messages were between Kal and Ryan

Newman said he read the text messages and that in the text messages Ryan Holm

indicated he was having a hard time, and Kal was trying to console him.5o

40 Bivins Report pp. 1 and 6.
41 Bivins Report p. 6.
42 Dawson Depo., 16:14.
43 Bivins Report p. 1.
44 HT 90:9-11.
45 HT 90:7-91:8.
46 HT 94:2-96:4.
47 HT 94:2-96:4.
48 HT 95:14-96:18.
49 HT 95:14-96:18.
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D.

Officer Bivins' Testimony.

Officer Allen A. Bivins is employed with the Idaho State Police ("ISPJJ) and he is an
accident reconstructionist.

51

Officer Bivins investigated the scene of Kal's car accident.

52

Based

on Officer Bivins' investigation, he concluded that Kal was travelling at a speed of around 123
miles per hour when he crashed.

53

Officer Bivins testified he could not say whether alcohol was a "substantial cause" for
Kal's speeding and that alcohol affects people in different ways.54 Officer Bivins testified that
an inexperienced drinker may experience a greater level of impairment versus an experienced
drinker consuming the same amount of alcohol.

55

Officer Bivins testified he knew that Kal had

used alcohol prior to the day of the accident and had built up some tolerance for alcohol.
Officer Bivins cited Kal for underage drinking in 2007.

56

57

Officer Bivins stated that "speed" was a substantial contributing factor to Kal's
accident.

58

Officer Bivins stated that he has received special training as a patrol officer on how

50 HT 95:14-96:18.
51 HT 55:19-56:11.
52 HT 56:21-58:11.
53 HT 62:18-25.
54 HT 76:4-11.
55 HT 73:17-74:10.
56 HT 74:11-75:7.
57 See Jefferson County Case No. CR-2007-1809 (this case history is included in Officer Bivins' Report).
58 HT 75:21-25.
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to drive fast.

59

Officer Bivins stated that he would probably not be successful at negotiating

the curve driving Kal's truck at 123 miles per hour, and he would not try to do it.

6o

Officer Bivins said texting can be a factor in causing an accident because it calls
attention off the roadway.61 Officer Bivins agreed that people can speed and exercise poor
judgment, even when alcohol is not a factor at all.
E.

62

Dr. Joe Anderson's Testimony.

Dr. Joe Anderson is a board certified emergency room physician and Chief Medical
Officer for Eastern Idaho Regional Medical Center.
in the State of Idaho since 1991.

64

63

He has been licensed to practice medicine

He also works as a psychiatrist at the Mental Wellness

Center, where he diagnoses mental illnesses and prescribes medication to treat mental
illnesses.

65

He also provides diagnostic treatment at Children's Supportive Services and

psychiatric evaluations and treatments for another organization called Transitions.

66

Dr.

Anderson is trained in pharmacology and toxicology.67

59 HT 79:22-25 (Emphasis added).
60 HT 80:19-81:21.
61 HT 82:14-83:6.
62 HT 84:5-8.
63 Anderson Depo., 5:2-15; 6:24-25.
64 Anderson Depo., 6:20-22.
65 Anderson Depo., 5:19-6:19.
66 Anderson Depo., 5:19-6:19.
67 Anderson Depo., 7:2-16.
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Dr. Anderson stated that Kal has an Axis 1 diagnosis of attention deficit hyperactivity
disorder ("ADHDIf)68 and that ADHD causes a person to have an addictive personality.69 Dr.
Anderson opined that one of Kal's major addictions is his addiction to speed.

70

Dr. Anderson testified that in his opinion the reasonable and substantial cause of Kal's
injuries is "excessive speed caused by an addictive personality with his ADHD where he was
addicted to speed.

lf71

Dr. Anderson bases his opinion that Kal was addicted to speed on

"excessive speeding tickets. The need for speed. Building a truck that was built for speed. A
badge of courage ... in which he considered himself a speed demon, all those kinds of things.
And we know that ADHD people do have addictive personalities.

lfn

Dr. Anderson testified that he considered alcohol to be a minor factor for Kal's accident
because he could find no medical evidence that supports the theory that drinking alcohol
causes a person to drive faster.

73

In addition, Dr. Anderson stated that nobody can say based

on reasonable medical probability that alcohol was a reasonable and substantial cause of the
injuries Kal sustained because there is no way to quantify the exact percent of alcohol that is
.
• a person. 74 A ccor d'rng t 0 DAd
" aIco h
' . If75 He
gorng
to .
Impair
r. n erson, K
a wasinotan
0 ivlrgrn.

stated it is important to take into account a person's prior alcohol consumption because over

68 Anderson
69 Anderson
70 Anderson
71 Anderson
72 Anderson
73 Anderson
74 Anderson

Depo.,
Depo.,
Depo.,
Depo.,
Depo.,
Depo.,
Depo.,

14:7-12.
14:7-20.
14:7-20.
24:17-19.
24:20-25:4.
21:18-22:2; 25:5-20.
21:11-15; 27:23-28:12.
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time a person can build up a level of tolerance to alcohol and become better at functioning
while under the influence of alcohol.

76

Furthermore, Dr. Anderson stated that while a certain number of people could still
negotiate that corner with a .11 BAC going at or below the speed limit, nobody could make that
corner going 123 miles per hour.77
Dr. Anderson stated that Kal's ADHD caused Kal to engage in risk-taking behavior,
including driving at excessive speeds and being very impulsive.

78

He stated that a correlation

cannot be drawn between alcohol and speed because Kal received many speeding tickets when

.
d 79
h e was not .
intoxicate .
F.

Gary Dawson's Testimony.

Gary Dawson has a Ph.D. in pharmacology.8o Mr. Dawson is not a medical doctor.

81

Mr.

Dawson is not qualified to make a diagnosis of Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder
("ADHD"), and he is not qualified to prescribe any medications for ADHD.

82

Mr. Dawson stated that Kal's blood alcohol content together with the presence of
opiates produced a marked impairment of his ability to operate a motor vehicle in a safe
manner and his resultant intoxication was a reasonable and substantial cause of the accident

75 Anderson Depo., 23:1-5.
76 Anderson Depo., 23:1-13.
77 Anderson Depo., 28:4-20; 21:18-22:20.
78 Anderson Depo., 28:21-29:25.
79 Anderson Depo., 29:17-25.
80 Dawson Depo., 5:10-11.
81 Dawson Depo., 32:9-11.
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and Kal's injuries.

83

Mr. Dawson agreed that a person can have alcohol and opiates in their

system which has an effect on a person but that is not a substantial cause of the accident. 84
Mr. Dawson stated that Kal's speed of 123 miles per hour was a "huge factor" and a
substantial factor in causing Kal's accident. 85
Mr. Dawson further stated that the only evidence "you need" to show that alcohol was
a substantial cause of Kal's injuries is Kal's BAC and Kal's crash. 86 He testified as follows:
Q.
What facts do you have to say that, on the night of the accident, the
alcohol was the substantial factor, as opposed to his general propensity to drive fast?
A.
The alcohol level of .11. He is drunk, and he crashed. He missed the
turn. He didn't even try to make the turn, from what it looked like in the
reconstruction. You are drunk, and you crash.
Q.
And that is all of the facts that you have got?
A.
That's all you need, to look at that relationship.87

Importantly, Mr. Dawson did not opine that Kal was driving at 123 mph and texting
because he had been drinking alcohol. 88 Mr. Dawson agreed that alcohol probably did not
89
cause Kal to drive 123 miles per hour and that it is pure speculation to attempt to link Kal's
speed at the time of the accident to Kal's alcohol consumption. 9o

82
83
84
85
86
87
88

Dawson
Dawson
Dawson
Dawson
Dawson
Dawson
Dawson

Depo.,
Depo.,
Depo.,
Depo.,
Depo.,
Depo.,
Depo.,

76:14-20.
27:22-28:5.
50:5-11.
79:14-22; 81:24-82:15.
90:9-18.
90:9-18.
101:7-11.
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COURSE Of PROCEEDINGS

Kal's Complaint And Respondents' Answer
On June 12, 2009, Kal filed a worker's compensation complaint against his employer,
Eagle Farms, Inc. and the State Insurance Fund (collectively "the Employer//). 91 The Employer
filed its answer to the complaint and raised various affirmative defenses, including that Kal's
intoxication was a reasonable and substantial cause of his injury "such that pursuant to Idaho
Code Section 72-208, no income benefits shall be paid to Claimant.//

92

Motion to Bifurcate
On July 24, 2009, Kal filed a motion to bifurcate the issues of compensability/liability
and the issues related to benefits and damages. 93 The Employer stipulated to the motion to
bifurcate the issues.

94

On January 26,2010, the Commission entered an Amended Order

Bifurcating Issues and ordered that "the only issue before the Industrial Commission at this
time is whether Claimant is precluded from recovering benefits pursuant to Idaho Code § 72208(2).// 95

89
90
91
92
93
94
95

Dawson Depo., 54:20-23.
Dawson Depo., 55:9-14.
R Vol. I, p. 1.
R Vol. I, pp. 5-7.
R Vol. I, pp. 8-9.
R Vol. I, p. 11.
R Vol. I, p. 15
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Hearing
On June 12,2012, Michael E. Powers (the "Referee") conducted the hearing for the
Commission.

96

At the hearing, both parties presented oral and documentary evidence.

97

After the hearing, the record remained open for the taking of the post-hearing depositions of
Mr. Dawson and Dr. Anderson.

98

The parties then submitted their briefs and the case was

taken under advisement by the Commission on April 29, 2013.

The Commission's Findings
Commission's Order.

99

0/ Fact, Conclusion 0/ Law, And Recommendation, And The

On August 27, 2013, the Referee issued his Findings of Fact, Conclusion of Law, and
Recommendation ("Findings"). 100 In his Findings, the Referee refused to consider any evidence
of texting because Kal could not "locate his cell phone/' the issue was "not raised until the
hearing/' and the "evidence regarding texting cannot be corroborated."

101

The Referee also

declined to find that Kal's failure to wear a seat belt was a reasonable and substantial cause of
his injuries. The Referee stated that "the evidence in the record is insufficient to establish the
degree, if any, to which Claimant's injuries would have been ameliorated, had he been belted
•

In.

11102

96 R Vol. I, p. 17; HT 2:1-4:22.
97 R Vol. I, p. 17; HT 2:1-4:22.
98 R Vol. I, p. 17.
99 R Vol. I, p. 17.
100 R Vol. I, p. 17.
101 R Vol. I, p. 20.
102 R Vol. I, p. 19.
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The Referee also found the opinions of Mr. Dawson more persuasive than Dr. Anderson
because, among other things, "Dr. Anderson did not have an opinion regarding the effects of
hydrocodone or opiates [which] may [have] contributed to Claimant's accident .... ,,103
The Referee concluded that the "clearest explanation for Claimant's unusual reckless
state of mind, based upon the evidence in the record, is that he was experiencing impairment
due to intoxication" and that "Defendants have met their burden of proving Claimanfs
intoxication was a reasonable and substantial factor contributing to his accident and
.

.

.

InJunes.

,,104

On the same day the Referee issued his Decision, the Commission issued its Order,
approving and adopting the Referee's Decision as their own. 105 In its Order, the Commission
ordered that: (1) "Defendants have met their burden in proving that Claimant's intoxication
was a reasonable and substantial cause of his injuries, such that he is barred from receiving
income benefits pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-208" and (2) "[p]ursuant to Idaho Code § 72-718,
this decision is final and conclusive as to all matters adjudicated." 106
On September 26,2013, Kal timely filed his Notice of Appeal.

103
104
105
106
107
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ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

1.

Did the Industrial Commission commit reversible error by refusing to consider

evidence that Kal was texting at the time of the accident?
2.

Did the Industrial Commission commit reversible error by finding that

intoxication was a reasonable and substantial cause of his injuries?
3.

Did the Industrial Commission commit reversible error by relying on Kal's use of

prescription medication to find that intoxication was a reasonable and substantial cause of
Kal's injuries?
4.

Did the Industrial Commission commit reversible error by refusing to find that

Kal's failure to wear a seat belt was a reasonable and substantial cause of his injuries?
ARGUMENT
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Idaho Supreme Court has stated:
When reviewing a decision of the Industrial Commission, this Court exercises free
review over questions of law. Zapata v. l.R. Simplot Co., 132 Idaho 513, SiS, 975 P.2d
1178,1180 (1999). This Court's review with respect to questions of fact is limited to
whether the Industrial Commission's findings are supported by substantial and
competent evidence; if so, they will not be disturbed on appeal. Id. Substantial and
competent evidence is relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept to
support a conclusion. Eacret v. Clearwater Forest Indus., 136 Idaho 733, 735, 40 P.3d 91,
93 (2002). This Court will not disturb the Commission's determination as to the weight
and credibility of evidence unless clearly erroneous. Zapata, 132 Idaho at SiS, 975 P.2d
at 1180. "Finally, in reviewing a decision of the Commission, this Court views all the
facts and inferences in the light most favorable to the party who prevailed before the
Commission./I Id. (internal quotations omitted).
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The terms of Idaho's workers' compensation statute are liberally construed in favor of
the employee. Haldiman v. Am. Fine Foods, 117 Idaho 955,956-57,793 P.2d 187, 18889 (1990). However, conflicting facts need not be construed liberally in favor of the
worker. Bennett v. Bunker Hill Co., 88 Idaho 300, 305, 399 P.2d 270, 272 (1965).

Mazzone v. Texas Roadhouse, Inc., 154 Idaho 750, 755 (2013) (emphasis added).
I.

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR BY REFUSING TO CONSIDER
EVIDENCE THAT KAL WAS TEXTING AT THE TIME OF THE ACCIDENT.
In the Findings of Fact, Conclusion of Law, and Recommendation, the Referee stated:
For the first time, Claimant alleged at hearing that he may also have been texting and
was thereby distracted at the time he missed the curve. Although he has no
independent recollection of texting, 108 he bases his proposition on the fact that once he
recovered his cell phone from the accident scene, it showed that he had been texting a
friend at the time of the accident. As Claimant cannot locate his cell phone, and his cell
phone usage as a contributing factor in causing his accident was not raised until the
hearing, any evidence regarding texting cannot be corroborated and will not be
considered in this decision, even though some quoted material may reference cell
109
phone usage.
The Commission erred in refusing to consider the evidence in the record regarding
texting for the reasons stated below.
A.

The Referee's Strict Adherence To The Rules Of Evidence Is Reversible Error And Is
Contrary To The Policies Of Industrial Commission Proceedings.
In Mazzone v. Texas Roadhouse, Inc., 154 Idaho 750, 758 (2013), this Court held that:
"Strict adherence to the rules of evidence is not required in Industrial
Commission proceedings and admission of evidence in such proceedings is more
relaxed." Hagler v. Micron Tech., 118 Idaho 596, 598, 798 P.2d 55, 57 (1990) (emphasis

108 The Referee fails to mention the reason that Kal does not have an independent recollection of texting at the
time of the accident was because he suffered a severe brain injury. See HT 42:2-43:21.
109 R Vol. I, p. 20 (emphasis added).
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in original). The policies of Industrial Commission proceedings are simplicity,
accommodation of claimants, and justice. Id. at 599, 798 P.2d at 58. The legislature
intended the industrial commission to have the IIdiscretionary power to consider any
type of reliable, trustworthy evidence having probative value ... even though that
evidence may not be admissible in a court of law." Hite v. Kulhenak Bldg. Contractor, 96
Idaho 70, 72, 524 P.2d 531,533 (1974).
Id. at 758. Furthermore, the exclusion of evidence based on the strict application of the rules

of evidence is grounds for reversible error. See Mussman v. Kootenai County, 150 Idaho 68, 73
(2010); Hagler v. Micron Technology, Inc., 118 Idaho 596, 598-99 (1990).

In this case, the Referee excluded all the texting evidence because it was "not raised
until the hearing."

llD

While the Referee cited to no rule or authority in his Findings to exclude

the texting evidence, it appears he was relying on some sort of evidentiary standard to exclude
the evidence.
The Referee's strict adherence to the rules of evidence is contrary to the policies of
Industrial Commission proceedings. In particular, the polices of "simplicity, accommodation to
the claimants and justice." Mazzone at 758.
This is particularly true in this case where: (1) the Employer never objected at the
hearing or after the hearing to the admission of the texting evidence; (2) the hearing officer did
not strike or disallow the testimony of the texting evidence at the hearing; (3) the record
remained open for another approximately eight months after the hearing for further discovery
during which the Referee or Employer could have conducted discovery or made further inquiry

110 R Vol. I, p. 20.
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regarding the texting evidence but simply chose not to;111 (4) the Employer can show no
prejudice for allowing the admission of the texting evidence; and (5) the Referee decided to
exclude the texting information for the first time in his Findings issued 14 months after the

. 112
h eanng.
Importantly, this is not a case where the Referee admitted and then simply

IIdiscounted" the significance of the texting evidence. See Mussman at 73 (2010). Instead, the
Referee excluded the evidence altogether.
The Referee's exclusion of texting evidence because it was raised for the first time at
the hearing lI un dermines the legal purpose of Industrial Commission proceedings to
accommodate claimants and promote justice in simple proceedings." Mazzone at 761.
Furthermore, the strict application of the rules of evidence is not required in Industrial
Commission proceedings and is reversible error. Thus, the Court should rule that the Referee's
erred in excluding the evidence of texting in his Findings.
B.

The Referee Erred In Ruling That Corroborating Evidence Was Necessary.
In Fields v. Buffalo-Idaho Mining Co., 55 Idaho 212, -- (1935), this Court held that lI[t]he

board erred in considering that corroborating evidence was necessary ... ." Id. Also, this Court
has IIheld that the referee 'must accept as true the positive, uncontradicted testimony of a
credible witness, unless this testimony is inherently improbable, or rendered so by facts and

111 R Vol. I, p. 17.
112 R Vol. I, p. 17.
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circumstances disclosed at the hearing or tria!.'" Mazzone v. Texas Roadhouse, Inc., 154 Idaho
750, 758 (2013) (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
Here, another reason the Referee gave for refusing to consider Kal's testimony
regarding texting is that the "texting evidence cannot be corroborated." 113 The Referee's
finding that corroborating evidence was necessary is error and contrary to the holding in Fields.
Moreover, even if corroborating evidence were required, the court ignored corroborating
evidence in this case.
The verb "corroborate" is defined as follows:
To strengthen; to add weight or credibility to a thing by additional and confirming facts
or evidence. The testimony of a witness is said to be corroborated when it is shown to
correspond with the representation of some other witnesses, or to comport with some
facts otherwise known or established. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, 311 {5th ed.1979}.
State v. Grist, 147 Idaho 49, 54 {2009} (emphasis added).

Kal does not have any memory of the accident because of the severe brain injury he
sustained as a result of the accident.

114

At the hearing, Kal testified that after the accident he

had a chance to look at his cell phone and he saw that he had been sending texts to his friend
Ryan Holm throughout the evening of his accident. 115 Kal said that his phone showed that he
sent his last text to Ryan at 3:30 a.m. (which was the approximate time of his accident). 116

113 R Vol. I, p. 20.
114 HT 42:2-43:21.
115 HT 50:6-51:6.
116 HT 50:6-51:6; 58:19-21.
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In addition to Kal's testimony regarding texting l Kal's father and employer, Newman,
also testified regarding Kal's texting. Newman testified that after the accident, Newman sent
some of his employees over to the place of the accident with some flatbeds and track hoes to
clean up the wreckage.

117

In the process of moving the truck, one of the employees found KalIs

cellphone and brought it to Newman.ll8 Newman checked the most recent text messages on
the cell phone and saw that there were about 3 or 4 text messages on the phone between the
time period of 3:15 a.m. and 3:30 a.m. the morning of the accident.
between Kal and Ryan Holm.

120

119

The text messages were

Newman said he read the text messages and that in the text

messages Ryan Holm indicated he was having a hard time, and Kal was trying to console him.

121

The time sequence of when Newman learned about the cell phone and texting explains
why Officer Bivins never included this critical information in his report. When Officer Bivins
interviewed Newman, Newman would not have known anything to tell Officer Bivins about the
cellphone and the texting

122

because Newman spoke with Officer Bivins the morning after the

accident whereas Newman's employee did not discover the cellphone and tell Newman about
it until approximately two or three days after the accident.

123

117 HT 94:2-96:4.
118 HT 94:2-96:4.
119 HT 95:14-96:18.
120 HT 95:14-96:18.
121 HT 95:14-96:18.
122 HT 64:11-65:9; 94:9-95:11.
123 HT 94:9-95:11.
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Newman stated he had no idea when he was looking at Kal's cellphone that it would
become an issue in the future regarding the cause of Kal's accident.

124

Newman said the

reason he did not think to mention texting as a cause of the accident during his deposition was
because at the time of his deposition he did not even know how to text, so he did not consider
it a factor at the time.

125

Since that time, Newman has started using texting, and he has

personally experienced texting and driving and now understands that it is not safe.

126

Newman

stated that he obviously would have attempted to preserve the cell phone if he had only
known it would be an issue, but at the time ofthe accident he did not even know if his son
would Iive.127 He was concerned for his son's life and not about gathering eVidence.

128

The consistent and uncontradicted testimony of Newman corroborates Kal's testimony
regarding Kal's texting at the time of the accident. The Employer and the State Insurance Fund
offered no contrary evidence. Nonetheless, the Referee refused to consider this corroborated
evidence oftexting in his Findings. Therefore, the Referee erred in requiring corroborating
evidence and in ignoring the corroborating evidence in this case.

124 HT 104:3-6.
125 HT 99:24-100:9.
126 HT99:24-100:9.
127 HT 104:7-20.
128 HT 104:7-20.
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C.

The Industrial Commission Erred In Refusing To Consider The Evidence Of Kal's Texting
At The Time Of The Accident Because It Is An Undisputed Fact.
Newman is an owner of Eagle Farms, Inc. (a defendant in this caseL which was Kal's

employer.

129

Because Newman is Kal's employer and a defendant in this case, his testimony

regarding Kal's cell phone usage at the time of the accident is an admission by the opposing
party. This makes the texting evidence an undisputed fact in this case. Thus, the Commission
should have considered the undisputed texting evidence and the Commission erred in
excluding this evidence from its Findings.
D.

The Industrial Commission's Refusal To Consider Evidence OfTexting Is Not Harmless
Error.
According to the National Safety Council, at least 28% of all traffic crashes - or at least

1.6 million crashes each year - involve drivers using cell phones and texting.

130

Idaho Code

Section 49-1401A prohibits texting while driving.
The Employer's expert, Mr. Dawson, agreed that people text all the time while driving a
car without having consumed any alcoho/.131 Mr. Dawson agreed that the Idaho legislature
passed a law outlawing texting and driving because people were getting into accidents while
texting and driving.

132

Mr. Dawson testified that someone that talks on their cell phone while

driving is the equivalent of someone driving with a BAC of .08.

133

Mr. Dawson stated that

129 R Vol. I, p. 17., HT 90:7-91:11.

130 http://www.nsc.org/Pages/NSCestimates16millioncrashescausedbydriversusingceflphonesandtexting.aspx
131 Dawson Depo., 73:24-74:1.
132 Dawson Depo., 72:2-20.
133 Dawson Depo., 96:16-21.
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texting while driving is not safe and that texting while driving at 123 miles per hour could be a
substantial factor in causing the accident.

134

Moreover, Officer Bivins said texting can be a

factor in causing an accident because it calls attention off the roadway.135
Thus, given the fact that all parties agree that texting could be a substantial cause of
Kal's injuries and that almost one out of three car crashes in the U.S. results from cell phone
use, the Referee's refusal to even consider any evidence of texting was not a harmless error in
determining whether intoxication was a substantial cause of Kal's injuries.

II.
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR BY FINDING THAT
INTOXICATION WAS A REASONABLE AND SUBSTANTIAL CAUSE OF KAL'S INJURIES BECAUSE IT
WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL AND COMPETENT EVIDENCE.
A.

Kal's Blood Alcohol Level Of.11 Alone Does Not Prove That Intoxication Is A Substantial
Cause Of Kal's Injuries.
Officer Bivins testified that he could not say whether alcohol was a "substantial cause"

for Kal's accident.

136

Furthermore, Dr. Anderson testified that nobody can say based on

reasonable medical probability that alcohol was a reasonable and substantial cause of the
injuries.

137

Thus, the only testimony that the Referee relied on in finding that intoxication was

a reasonable and substantial cause of Kal's injuries is Mr. Dawson's testimony.

134 Dawson Depo., 100:1-16.
135 HT 82:14-83:6.
136 HT 76:4-11; 76:4-11.
137 Anderson Depo., 21:11-15; 27:23-28:12.
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In the Findings, the Referee relied on the following testimony of Mr. Dawson in
reaching the conclusion that intoxication was a reasonable and substantial cause of Kal's
injuries:

Q.

What facts do you have to say that, on the night of the accident, the
alcohol was the substantial factor, as opposed to his general propensity to drive
fast?
A.
The alcohol level of .11. He is drunk, and he crashed. He missed the
turn. He didn't even try to make the turn, from what it looked like in the
reconstruction. You are drunk, and you crash.
Q.
And that is all of the facts that you have got?
A.
That's all you need, to look at that relationship.138
According to Mr. Dawson, the fact that Kal was "drunk" is all he needs to prove that
alcohol was a substantial cause of Kal's accident. This logic and opinion is dearly contrary to
the holding in Hatley v. Lewiston Grain Growers, Inc., 97 Idaho 719, 722 (1976), where the
Court stated that the "the finding of intoxication does not necessitate a finding that the
intoxication caused the accident."
Moreover, other jurisdictions have also found that intoxication alone does not prove
that intoxication was a cause of the accident. "[T]he fact [that claimant] was over the legal
limit, by itself, does not prove that intoxication was the factual cause ofthe accident./I
Employers Mut. Cas. Co. v. Boiler Erection and Repair Co., 964 A.2d 381, 397 (Pa.Super. 2008);
see also Folse v. American Well Control, 536 So.2d 686, 690 (La.App.1988) ("[T] he jurisprudence

uniformly holds that the defendant must prove by some competent evidence other than the

138 Dawson Depo., 90:9-18.
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mere fact of intoxication that the accident was caused by the intoxication."}; 82 Am.Jur. 2d
Workers' Compensation § 225 (((Generally ... the fact of intoxication alone at the time of the
accident is not a sufficient basis for denying workers' compensation benefits ... ."); Republic
Indemnity Co. v. Workers' Camp. Appeals Bd., 138 Cal.App.3d 42, 46 (CaI.App.2.Dist.1982) (((We
acknowledge that generally the fact of intoxication standing alone is not a sufficient basis for
denying workers' compensation benefits.")
In his Findings, the Referee rejected Kal's reliance on Hatley because in Hatley the
applicable statute required a [(showing of proximate cause rather than showing a reasonable
and substantial cause" and in Hatley ((defendants had to overcome a rebuttable
presumption."

139

However, regardless of whether the standard of proof is to show that

intoxication was the cause of the accident or a substantial cause of the accident, the
Employer's burden of proof requires more than just a blood alcohol reading of .11 or the mere
happening of the accident to prove causation. See Folse at 692 (A blood alcohol level of .16 ((at
the time of the accident ... [was] insufficient evidence that intoxication was a substantial
cause of the accident"). Otherwise, Idaho Code Section 72-208 would be a strict liability
statute and would deny benefits any time the claimant's blood alcohol was above the
applicable legal limit. If the Idaho Legislature intended Section 72-208 to be a strict liability
standard, it would not have placed the burden on the Employer to prove that intoxication was
a ((reasonable and substantial cause of the injury."
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The facts in Hatley v. Lewiston Groin Growers, Inc., 97 Idaho 719 (1976) and Folse v.

American Well Control, 536 So.2d 686 (La.App.1988) are strikingly similar to this case and
demonstrate why a finding of intoxication alone is insufficient to find that the intoxication was
a substantial case of the Kal's injuries and there has to be some other evidence of impairment.

1.

The Hatley Case.

In Hatley v. Lewiston Groin Growers, Inc., 97 Idaho 719 (1976L Jesse Hatley ("Hatley}})
was killed in the course of his employment when his semi-truck overturned while he was
returning to Lewiston, Idaho, from Great Falls, Montana, on U.S. Highway 12. Prior to the
accident, Hatley had stopped outside of Missoula at a truck stop in Lolo, Montana, at
approximately 2:30 p.m. He left the truck stop between 3:30 p.m. and 4:00 p.m.
Approximately 30 minutes later, Hatley's truck overturned twenty miles west of the truck stop.
A bottle of whiskey, which was one-third empty, was found in the cab, and a subsequent test
revealed Hatley had a blood alcohol level of .117 percent.
The tire marks of Hatley's truck indicated that Hatley failed to negotiate a curve in the
road and the rear wheels of the trailer went off the pavement. The investigating police officer
testified that in his opinion Hatley took the curve too fast and that his ability to operate the
vehicle was impaired by his consumption of alcohol. Also, defendants' expert, a clinical
chemist and toxicologist, testified and gave his opinion that an individual's reflexes, depth
perception, and overall ability to operate a vehicle would be impaired with a .117 BAC.

139 R Vol. I, p.28.
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In addition, a witness testified that she was with Hatley most of the time at the truck
stop, Hatley did not appear drunk, and she could not smell alcohol on him. Another witness at
the truck stop testified that he never saw Hatley take a drink of alcohol, although Hatley
mentioned he had a bottle of whiskey in his truck.
The Industrial Commission found that although Hatley had a .117 BAC, Hatley was
intoxicated to an "unknown degree." The Commission considered the evidence that Hatley did
not appear to be intoxicated while at the truck stop and that he consumed no alcoholic
beverages while being there. The Commission concluded that "there is an absence of

substantial evidence that the claimant's death was occasioned by his intoxication." Id. at 721
(emphasis added).
The Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the Commission's decision and found that the
employer did not present substantial evidence that intoxication caused Hatley's death. The
Idaho Supreme Court analyzed the issue as follows:
[I]t is incumbent upon an employer relying on the intoxication defense to come
forth with substantial affirmative evidence showing that the employee was intoxicated
at the time of death and also that the intoxication proximately resulted in the injury.
Potter v. Realty Trust Co., 60 Idaho 281, 90 P.2d 699 (1939). It is not sufficient that the
defendant present negative evidence, e. g., tending to rule out other possible causes of
the injury such as mechanical difficulties, bad weather or another vehicle on the road.
Evidence that the employee may have been drinking at the time of the accident does
not necessarily establish that he was intoxicated at that time, nor does a finding that

he was intoxicated lead to an inevitable conclusion that the intoxication caused the
accident.

***
The employer and surety have placed great emphasis on the blood alcohol level
test results which were .117 percent, and the testimony of the toxicologist regarding
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the effect of a .117 blood alcohol level on an individual. ... [Ilt is clear that the
Commission did utilize this evidence in arriving at its finding that Hatley was intoxicated
to an unknown degree at the time of the accident. However, the finding of intoxication
does not necessitate aJinding that the intoxication caused the accident. ... The cases
from other jurisdictions cited by appellants which have regarded blood alcohol level as
persuasive evidence that intoxication caused the employee's injury had involved

considerably higher blood alcohol level readings, e. g., .27, .29, .351 and .387 percent.

The only other testimony regarding causation was the expert testimony of the
toxicologist regarding the effect of a .117 blood alcohol level on a person's ability to
operate a motor vehicle, and the opinion of the investigating officer. Since neither had

witnessed the accident, both opinions were of necessity couched in generalities . ...
Consequently, we conclude that the Industrial Commission did not err in its conclusion
that there was a lack of substantial evidence in the record that Hatley's death was
caused by intoxication.

Id. at 722-723 (emphasis added and citations omitted).
Similar to the defendant's expert in Hatley, the Employer expert's, Mr. Dawson,
testified regarding the effect of a .11 blood alcohol level on a general person's ability to
operate a motor vehicle. He concluded that all you need to show that alcohol was a
substantial cause of Kal's injuries is that Kal had a blood alcohol level of .11 and he crashed. 140
He stated "That's all you need, to look at that relationship.,,141
This logic and opinion is clearly contrary to the case law cited above. The fact that Kal's
SAC was .11, by itself, does not prove that intoxication was a substantial cause of Kal's injuries;
otherwise, Idaho Code Section 72-208 would create a strict liability standard.

140 Dawson Depo., 90:9-18.
141 Dawson Depo., 90:9-18.
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Furthermore, the Commission erred in relying exclusively on Mr. Dawson's opinion
because just like defendant's expert in Hatley, Mr. Dawson's opinion does not take into
account any specific facts that relate to Kal, such as Kal's prior drinking experience, what level
of tolerance Kal had built up to the effects of alcohol, testimony of how Kal was behaving that
night, and when he had his last drink. Instead, Mr. Dawson bases his opinion on his
understanding of the effect a .11 blood alcohol level has generally on person's ability to
operate a motor vehicle. As such, Mr. Dawson's opinion ignores other relevant factors and is
impermissibly "couched in generalities" and not based on the effects of alcohol in this case
specifically. Hatley, 97 Idaho at 723.
Furthermore, in his Findings, the Referee ignored relevant facts specific to this case.
For example, Jonathan said he was with Kal for most of the night. Jonathan was with Kal when
Kal drove to Terreton to fix the sprinkler pivot. Jonathan was with Kal for almost two hours
commuting to and fixing the sprinkler pivot and for half an hour driving back from fixing the
sprinkler pivot. Jonathan said that he never saw Kal drinking alcohol. Jonathan also said that
he could not smell any alcohol on Kal's breath even though he was sitting right next to him in
the truck. The Referee ignores all these facts that tend to show that some factors other than
alcohol caused the accident.
The Referee attempts to distinguish Hatley from this case by saying that "there is more
evidence here that Claimant's intoxication was a reasonable and substantial cause of his
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injuries than was present in Hatley.,,142 However, the Referee never identifies in his Findings
what "more evidence" exists here than in Hatley to conclude that Kal's intoxication was a
reasonable and substantial cause of his injuries. To the contrary, there is significantly "more
evidence" in this case to show that intoxication was not a reasonable and substantial cause of
Kal's injuries, such as:

*

Kal's texting while driving at time of the accident;

*

Kal had ADHD, a disease that increases the likelihood of people to have
addictions;

*

Kal was addicted to speed as evidenced by multiple prior speeding tickets (one
in excess of 100 miles per hour), a truck built for speed, and a need to have the
fastest truck in high school (Officer Bivins also testified that he had given Kal
warnings without tickets for speeding);

*

Kal's prior history of alcohol use (drinking daily) and how that affected his
tolerance to alcohol;

*

Kal drove for well over 30 minutes before the accident without incident (which
tends to show that Kal's texting on a corner while speeding is the reason he
crashed); and

*

Kal's prior history of driving while under the influence without getting in an
accident.

Moreover, Mr. Dawson acknowledged that he did not know if alcohol impaired Kal from
understanding how fast he was going

143

and he admitted that he has no evidence that Kal

would not have been driving at 123 mph and texting unless he had been drinking alcohol.

144

142 R Vol. I, p. 28.
143 Dawson Depo" 54:17-19.
144 Dawson Depo" 101:7-11.
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To the contrary, Mr. Dawson agreed that alcohol probably did not cause Kal to drive
123 miles per hour

145

and that it is pure speculation to attempt to link Kal's speed at the time

of the accident to Kal's alcohol consumption. 146 Therefore, Mr. Dawson really cannot say that
alcohol was a substantial cause of the accident.

147

Mr. Dawson testified:

Q.
And that's my point. Mr. Dawson, all you can say - in this case, given the
speed that my client was going, given the fact that you cannot link his speed to the
alcohol he consumed, all you can really say is that alcohol was a contributing factor but
not a substantial factor of the crash; isn't that true?
148
A.
Generally, yes.

The Referee's erred in exclusively relying on Mr. Dawson's opinion to find that
intoxication was a reasonable and substantial cause of Kal's injuries because Mr. Dawson relies
on the mere happening of the accident and Kal's BAC to conclude that intoxication was a
substantial cause of Kal's injuries while failing to identify any other evidence of impairment.
2.

The Folse Case.

An even more analogous case than Hatley, is Folse v. American Well Control, 536 So.2d
686 (La.App.1988), in which the court stated that "[i]n order for the defendants to prevail, they
must prove by a preponderance of the evidence both the fact of intoxication and that the
intoxication was a substantial cause of the accident." Id. at 690.
The facts in Folse are strikingly similar to this case. Mr. Folse was an employee of
American Well Control. Mr. Folse got in a car accident at approximately 11 p.m. on his way

145 Dawson Depo., 54:20-23.
146 Dawson Depo., 55:9-14.
147 Dawson Depo., 55:9-14.
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home from work. Mr. Folse was traveling along the same road he regularly traveled in going to
and from work. Mr. Folse was negotiating a curve to his right and, as the road began to
straighten out after the curve, he veered across the center line and into the left lane, where he
collided with an oncoming vehicle and he was killed. A blood sample from Mr. Folse's body
showed an alcohol level of .16 percent. Mr. Folse had driven almost the entire stretch of
highway to his home without incident prior to the accident. Id.
The evidence showed that Mr. Folse was 29 years old, that he was an experienced
drinker, that he drank almost "daily," that he had never gotten into any prior traffic accident,
and that he had only one prior traffic violation.
The defendants presented expert testimony of a pathologist that testified of the effects
of alcohol on one's ability to operate an automobile, and testified about the significant causal
relationship between Mr. Folse's alcohol consumption and the car accident. Defendant's
expert stated that a person with an alcohol level above .15 percent is usually considered
"drunk," meaning "under the influence of alcohol," and that anything above .10 percent would
be "drunk." Defendant's expert agreed that no two individuals are necessarily adversely
affected to the same extent by the same level of alcohol.
However, plaintiff's expert, also a pathologist, testified that given all of the facts
available, one simply could not say that intoxication was a substantial cause of the accident in
this particular case. He stated that the adverse effect of alcohol is different in different people

148 Dawson Depo., 71:6-12.
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and that there are many factors which affect the degree of impairment from alcohol, such as
age, sex, time of day, tolerance to impairment, and drinking experience. He stated that
research shows that experienced drinkers are more tolerant and less affected by alcohol than
those who are "alcohol naive."
In analyzing the facts of the Folse case, the court stated that in order to prove
causation, the courts have generally looked for "some evidence other than the mere
happening of the accident./I Id. The court explains as follows:
Such behavior could include slurring of speech, drowsiness, staggering, and
erratic driving prior to the accident. At the very least, the above cited cases require a
showing that the accident was of a sort that would not ordinarily happen absent

intoxication.
Id. (Emphasis added).
The court found that "the expert testimony alone is not enough to establish that Mr.
Folse was intoxicated at the time of the accident. No other evidence was offered concerning
any behavior of Mr. Folse prior to the accident that would suggest intoxication./I Id. at 692.
The court also found that "even assuming Mr. Folse was intoxicated at the time of the
accident, there is insufficient evidence that intoxication was a substantial cause ofthe
accident./I Id. The trial court found it was significant that Mr. Folse had driven almost the
entire stretch of highway to his home without incident prior to the accident.
Based on the reasons cited by the trial judge, the inconclusiveness of the scientific
evidence of alcohol impairment, and the absence of other evidence of alcohol impairment, the
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court affirmed the trial court's finding that "Mr. Folse's blood alcohol level of .16 was not a
substantial cause of the accident." Id. at 692.
Similar to the facts in Folse, at the time of the accident, Kal was a 19-year-old adult
male and "experienced drinker." He had been convicted of 3 prior underage drinking charges
in the 3 years leading up to his accident (in 2005, 2006, and 2007). He also received a DUI, and
his counseling records indicated that he drank "daily.,,149 Kal had not been in any prior car
accident and he had a habit of speeding.
Like the claimant in Folse, Kal had traveled the Old Basset Highway many times.
However, there is no evidence in the record that Kal, prior to the accident, had ever traveled
down the Old Basset Highway at night, or while texting, or while going 123 miles per hour, or
while not being intoxicated. Similar to the claimant in Folse, Kal had traveled on the Old Basset
Highway for 30 minutes without incident prior to his accident (which again tends to show that
texting on a corner while speeding is the cause of Kal's accident). In addition, Kal's .11 BAC was
substantially less than Mr. Folse's .16 BAC.
Here, the Commission does not point to any evidence of Kal's behavior prior to the
accident that would indicate Kal was impaired, such as slurring his speech, acting drowsy,
staggering, or swerving on the road. In fact, the evidence is just the opposite. Just prior to the
accident, Kal demonstrated his ability to function at a high level. He drove to the job site and
fixed a sprinkler pivot. He was able to send several texts while driving for 30 minutes without
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incident prior to the accident (all while presumably speeding). And although Jonathan was
with Kal for most of the night, he stated that he never saw Kal drinking and that he could not
smell alcohol on his breath.
Importantly, the facts in Kal's case are even more compelling than they were in Folse
because unlike Folse, substantial evidence weighs against the Commission's conclusion that
alcohol was a substantial cause of Kal's injuries, including the facts that he was texting on a
corner while going 123 miles per hour (which Officer Bivins stated he could not do), he had
ADHD, he was addicted to speed, he was driving a truck built for speed, he did not act impaired
prior to the accident, and he was not wearing his seat belt. Moreover, there is no evidence in
the record that alcohol causes a person to speed.
The Commission committed reversible error by finding that intoxication was a
reasonable and substantial cause of Kal's injuries based solely on the mere happening of the
accident and Kal's blood alcohol level of .11. In doing so, the Commission has transformed
Idaho Code Section 72-208(2) into a strict liability statute and removed the burden on the
Employer to prove that intoxication was a substantial cause of Kal's injuries. This is contrary to
Section 72-208(2) and contrary to the case law cited above that holds that claimant's .11 BAC
alone is not sufficient to show that intoxication was a substantial cause of his injuries.

149 Kal Depo., 22:16-25.
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B.

The Referee's Conclusion Is Based On Negative Evidence And Is Not Supported By
Substantial And Competent Evidence.
In Hatley, the court stated that, "It is not sufficient that the defendant present negative

evidence, e. g., tending to rule out other possible causes of the injury such as mechanical
difficulties, bad weather or another vehicle on the road." Id. at 722.
Here, the Referee essentially concluded that intoxication must be the a substantial
cause of his injuries by default after ignoring or ruling out other possible causes, or in other
words, the Referee relied on "negative evidence" to reach his conclusion. In particular, the
Referee made the following findings:
•

The Referee ruled out evidence of texting by concluding that the evidence was not
corroborated and needed to be raised prior to the hearing.

•

150

The Referee ruled out Kal's failure to wear a seat belt as a substantial cause of Kal's
injuries by shifting the burden on Kal to show that his injuries would have been minor if
he had been wearing a seat belt.

•

151

The Referee ruled out Kal's ADHD and addiction to speed by making the unsupported
finding that "if Claimant's ADHD was under control, then it follows his speed addiction
would be, too./I

152

150 R Vol. I, p. 20.
151 R Vol. I, p. 19.
152 R Vol. I, p. 27.
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•

The Referee ruled out speed as the cause by finding that since he never gotten into an
accident while speeding before the incident, speed could not be the cause of his
• •

.

InJunes.

153

After ruling out these possible causes, the Referee then concluded that the clearest
explanation for Kal's accident is that he was experiencing "impairment due to intoxication."ls4
However, the Referee's conclusion cannot simply be based on negative evidence. According to

Hatley, negative evidence does not suffice as "substantial" evidence. Id. Thus, the Referee's
reliance on negative evidence is insufficient to reach the conclusion by default that intoxication
was a substantial cause of Kal's injuries.

C.

The Referee's Finding That Kal Had An "Unusual" Reckless State Of Mind The Night Of
The Accident Is Not Supported By Substantial And Competent Evidence.
In his Findings, the Referee stated that:
Claimant testified that he generally drove safely, even when speeding. Yet the night of
his accident he admitted to driving recklessly. The clearest explanation for Claimant's
unusual reckless state of mind, based upon the evidence in the record, is that he was
experiencing impairment due to intoxication. iSS
The Referee's finding misconstrued Kal's testimony. Kal testimony was that he was "a

huge speeder," driving 100 miles per hour did not concern him, and that he "can handle [going
100 miles per hour] because [he] always [goes] fast."lS6 Kal testified that he cannot remember

153 R Vol. I, p. 27-28.
154 R Vol. I, p. 28.
155 R Vol. I, p. 28.
156 HT 33:14-21; Kal Oepo., 19:11-14; 20:11-14.
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anything from the night of the aCcident/

57

but when asked if he thought driving at 122 miles

per hour was reckless, Kal said "Yes, I know it's reckless driving.,,158
Kal's testimony shows that there was nothing unusual about Kal speeding or driving
over 100 miles per hour. In fact, Kal was a "habitual speeder.,,159 Thus, for the Referee to
conclude that Kal somehow had an "unusual reckless state of mind" the night of the accident
because he was speeding is not supported by competent and substantial evidence and ignores
the facts in the record. The record shows that Kal was not a good driver and always sped.

160

Speeding by its very nature is reckless and unsafe. It follows that if Kal was always speeding, he
was always driving recklessly and unsafely. There was nothing "unusual" about Kal speeding
the night of the accident.
The Referee's finding that Kal's "unusual" state of mind for speeding results from his
drinking alcohol is unsupported by the record. Even the Employer's own expert agreed that
alcohol probably did not cause Kal to drive 123 miles per hour
attempt to link Kal's speed to his alcohol consumption.

161

and it is pure speculation to

162

Thus, the Referee's finding that Kal's intoxication caused an "unusual" reckless state of
mind the night of the accident is not supported by substantial and competent evidence. As
such, this Court should reverse the Referee's finding.

157 HT 42:2-43:21.
158 HT 39:24-40:6
159 HT 102:10-11.
160 HT 91:14-23.
161 Dawson Depo., 54:20-23.
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III.
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR BY RELYING ON KAL'S USE OF
PRESCRIPTION MEDICATION TO FIND THAT INTOXICATION WAS A REASONABLE AND
SUBSTANTIAL CAUSE OF KAL'S INJURIES.
Idaho Code Section 72-208(3) states that:
(3) 'Intoxication' as used in this section means being under the influence of
alcohol or of controlled substances, as defined in section 37-2701(e), Idaho Code.
Provided, however, that this definition shall not include an employee's use of a
controlled substance for which a prescription has been issued authorizing such
substance to be dispensed to the employee, or when such substance is dispensed
directly by a physician to the employee, and where the employee's use ofthe
controlled substance is in accordance with the instructions for use ofthe controlled
substance.
I.e. § 72-208(3) (emphasis added).
Despite the prohibition from considering legally prescribed medication, the Referee, in
his Decision, frequently referred to the presence of "opiate and amphetamine substances in
[Kal's] system./

163

In particular, the Referee stated:

Dr. Dawson opined that the combination of alcohol and opiates in Claimant's system at
the time of the accident produced an additive depressant effect on Claimant's central
nervous system and the two are contraindicated. This, in turn, impaired Claimant's
cognitive abilities, judgment, alertness, decision-making, and attention, resulting in
disinhibition. Dr. Dawson opined that the alcohol Claimant consumed was a reasonable
and substantial cause of Claimant's accident: 'Blood alcohol, together with the
presence of opiates, produced a marked impairment of his ability to operate a motor
vehicle in a safe manner. His resultant intoxication was a reasonable and substantial
cause of the crash and subsequent injury.,164

162 Dawson Depo., 55:9-14.
163 R Vol. I, pp. 20, 22, 23, and 27.
164 R Vol. I, pp. 22-23 (emphasIs added).
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After Kal's accident, a urinalysis revealed that Kal had medication in his system.

165

However, as the Referee conceded, "[t]here [is] no evidence that these results were
inconsistent with the prescription medication Claimant was taking.,,166 Furthermore, there is
no evidence in the record that Kal took any controlled substances contrary to the instructions
given to him for using the controlled substances.
Thus, pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-208(3}, the Commission is barred from considering
Kal's use of legally prescribed medication in reaching the conclusion that intoxication was a
reasonable and substantial cause of Kal's injuries.
Furthermore, the Referee was critical of Dr. Anderson's opinion and stated that one of
the reasons Dr. Anderson's opinion was less persuasive then Dr. Dawson's opinion was because
"[h]e does not have an opinion regarding the effects of hydrocodone or opiates [which] may
have contributed to Claimant's accident .... ,,167 However, Dr. Anderson properly excluded the
effects of these prescription medications from his opinion.
Later in the Referee's decision, the Referee concluded that there was "more evidence"
in this case than in Hatley v. Lewiston Grain Growers, Inc., 97 Idaho 719 (1976) to find that
"Claimant's intoxication was a reasonable and substantial cause of his injuries." Since in Hatley
the driver's blood alcohol content was also .11, a reasonable inference can be made that the

165 Dawson Depo., 17:3-20:7.
166 R Vol. I, p. 20.
167 R Vol. I, p. 27.
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"more evidence" of intoxication that the Referee was referring to in Kal's case was his use of
prescription medication.
The Referee's reliance on evidence regarding the effects of prescription medication on
Kal is strictly prohibited under Idaho Code § 72-208(3). Idaho Code § 72-208(3) specifically
states that "intoxication" does not include controlled substances that are prescribed by a
physician. Notwithstanding this statue, the Referee relied on the medication evidence to
distinguish this case from the Hatley case, criticize Dr. Anderson's opinion, and support his
conclusion that Kal "was experiencing impairment due to intoxication.,,168 Therefore, the
Commission erred and violated Idaho Code § 72-208(3) in considering and relying on evidence
of legally prescribed medication to reach the conclusion that intoxication was a reasonable and
substantial cause of Kal's injuries.
IV.
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR BY REFUSING TO FIND THAT
KAL'S FAILURE TO WEAR A SEAT BELT WAS A REASONABLE AND SUBSTANTIAL CAUSE OF HIS
INJURIES.
In the proceedings below, Kal raised the argument that the Employer failed to show
that Kal's injuries would have been the same if Kal had worn a seat belt, or in the alternative,
the Employer failed to show that intoxication was a substantial cause for why Kal did not wear
a seat belt. In the Findings, the Referee stated:

168 R Vol. I, p. 20.
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The Referee finds [Claimant's seat belt] argument unpersuasive. It was the fact
that Claimant left the roadway at 123 miles per hour while legally intoxicated that
caused his accident which resulted in serious injuries. Moreover, the evidence in the

record is insufficient to establish the degree, if any, to which Claimant's injuries would
169
have been ameliorated, had he been belted in.
In the Referee's analysis, the Referee improperly focused on the cause of the accident,
rather than the cause of Kal's injuries. Idaho Code Section 72-208(2) requires the Employer to
prove that "intoxication is a reasonable and substantial cause of an injury," not an accident.
(Emphasis added).
Furthermore, the Referee improperly shifted the burden onto Kal to show that he
would not have sustained the same injuries if he had been wearing a seat belt. Importantly,
the Employer has the burden of proof to show that "intoxication is a reasonable and
substantial cause" of Kal's injuries. In other words, the Employer has to show that Kal would
have sustained the same injuries if he had been wearing a seat belt; otherwise, the reasonable
and substantial cause of Kal's injuries is failing to wear a seat belt, not intoxication. The
Employer failed to present any expert testimony or any evidence to establish that Kal's injuries
would have been the same if had been wearing a seat belt. In fact, the only evidence in the
record regarding Kal's seat belt supports the opposite position-that Kal's injuries would have
been minor if he had worn a seat belt.

169 R Vol. I, p. 19 (emphasis added).
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In this case, Kal's passenger, Jonathan Glodo, was wearing his seat belt and sustained
only minor injuries.

170

Kal was not wearing a seat belt, was ejected from the vehicle, landed 90

feet away from the vehicle, and sustained life threatening injuries.

l71

Kal's injuries included a

lacerated liver, one broken rib, a severe head injury, fractured left clavicle, and compression
fractures of the vertebrae in the neck and back.172 The Referee ignored this evidence showing
that if Kal had been wearing a seat belt, he likely would not have sustained life threatening
injuries, but only minor injuries.
Furthermore, the Employer was unable to show any evidence in the record that Kal's
intoxication caused Kal not to wear a seat belt. In fact, the evidence in the record was just the
opposite. Prior to Kal's accident, Kal had already been cited for failing to wear a seat belt.

173

This means that Kal did not wear a seat belt even when he was not intoxicated.
Kal has submitted some evidence that he would have suffered only minor injuries if he
had worn a seat belt (Kal was ejected from the vehicle and sustained a severe brain injury).
Therefore, the Employer had the burden to prove otherwise by a preponderance of the
evidence-which burden the Employer has failed to carry. Furthermore, the Referee
improperly focused on the cause of the accident, whereas Section 72-208(2) requires the
Referee to focus on the cause of the injuries. Thus, the Referee erred in shifting the burden on

170 Bivins Report pp. 5, 6, and 7.
171 Bivins Report pp. I, 4, and 5.
172 Bivins Report pp. 1 and 6.
173 See Bonneville County Case No. CR-2006-13341, where Kal was charged and convicted for failing to wear his
seat belt. This case history is attached to Officer Bivins's Report.
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Kal to show that wearing a seat belt would have prevented his injuries and in refusing to find
that Kal's failure to wear a seat belt was a reasonable and substantial cause of his injuries.

v.
THIS COURT SHOULD AWARD KAL HIS ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS.
On appeal, l/[cJosts shall be allowed as a matter of course to the prevailing party unless
otherwise provided by law or order of the Court." I.A.R.40(a}. Thus, if Kal is the prevailing
party, the Court should award costs to Kal.
Furthermore, Idaho Code Section 72-804 "permits the award of attorney fees if it is
determined that an employer ... contested a workers' compensation claim without reasonable
ground." Mazzone v. Texas Roadhouse, Inc., 154 Idaho 750, 761 (2013). Here, the Employer's
contention of Kal's workers' compensation claim was without reasonable ground because
there is no evidence that intoxication was a reasonable and substantial cause of Kal's injuries.
Thus, the Court should award Kal his attorney's fees and costs.

CONCLUSION
In conclusion, this Court should rule that the Commission erred in refusing to consider
evidence that Kal was texting at the time of the accident; the Commission erred in finding that
intoxication was a reasonable and substantial cause of his injuries; the Commission erred by
considering and relying on evidence of Kal's use of legally prescribed medication; and the
Commission erred in refusing to find that Kal's failure to wear a seat belt was a reasonable and
substantial cause of his injuries. For the reasons set forth herein, this Court should reverse the
APPELLANT'S BRIEF ON APPEAL
F:\CLlENTS\BDS\8039\Pleadings\012.Appellant's Brief.doc

Page 46 of 47

Commission, vacate the Commission's Order and Findings dated August 27, 2013, and hold that
the Employer has not met its burden, pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-208(2), of proving that
intoxication was reasonable and substantial cause of Kal's injuries. Furthermore, the Court
should also award Kal his costs and attorney's fees incurred below and on appeal.
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